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EXCLUSIVE REGULATION OF RAILROAD
BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

No. 3

RATES

PRACTICALLY speaking, every railroad in the United States
is a common carrier of foreign and interstate commerce. The
exceptions are so few and unimportant that they do not affect
the question to be discussed. Many of the steam railroads are
adopting electricity as a motor power, but this does not affect the
question. The term "'railroad" is here used to designate all common carriers transporting passengers and freight, excepting
"street railroads," and private lines operated by private industries in manufacturing plants. The question, ivhich is now much
debated, is whether Congress may regulate all rates, charges, and
practices by railroads doing interstate and intrastate business,
without an amendment to the federal constitution.
The constitution of the United States vests in Congress power
"to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the sev-

eral states.

.

.

."I

There are a few fundamental and well set-

tled rulings that should be stated before discussing the question
presented.
A shipment from any point within the United States destined
to a foreign port is foreign commerce, although the rail transportation to or from the port may be wholly within one state.2 A
I2 U. S. Constitution Art. I Sec. 8 C1. 3.

Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Sabine Tram Co., (1913) 227 U. S. 111, 57

L. Ed. 442, 33 S. C. R. 229.
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shipment from a point in one state to a point in, or over a part
of the territory of, another state, is interstate commerce.3 Whether
a shipment is foreign or interstate commerce is determined by its
essential character and not by mere billing.4 Although a railroad
may be wholly within a state, if it engages in any part of the
movement of foreign or interstate commerce, it is subject to the
act of Congress regulating commerce. 5 There must be a continuity
of movement from the point of origin to point of final destination, intended by the shipper or consignee at the time the shipment
starts, and the several carriers engaged in the movement must
perform the transportation under some general arrangement or
practice by which the shipment is moved from the point of origin
to the point of final destination without the necessary intervention
of, or reshipment by, the consignor or consignee. Under the
practice prevailing on all railroads at the present time, commerce
is facilitated and carried on either by through billing, or the
observance of the practice by each carrier, under which the shipment is delivered from one carrier to the connecting carrier without the intervention of the shipper. By this practice a shipment
delivered to the initial carrier never leaves the channel of interstate commerce until it is delivered to the consignee at the point
of final destination. Under many decisions by the courts this has
been held to make the shipment interstate or foreign commerce
without any express agreement between the carriers participating
in the transportation, and subjects all the carriers participating in
such carriage, and the shipment, to federal control. I
"Commerce," that may be regulated by Congress under the
constitution, consists of three constituent parts, namely, the
agents, the instrumentalities,and the subjects, of commerce. The
power of Congress is plenary over each one of these constituent
parts that comes under its jurisdiction; thus, as we have seen,
the subject of commerce, that is, the shipment transported, may
be interstate or foreign, while some agent of commerce transporting it a part of the way may be operating Wholly within a
state, and this may be true of instrumentalities used-road-bed,
3
Baer Bros. v. Denver, etc., R. Co., (1914) 233 U. S. 479, 34 S. C. R.
641; United States v. Delaware, etc., R. Co. (1907) 152 Fed. 269.

4 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Clark Coal Co., (1915) 238 U.S. 456, 59
L. Ed. 1406, 35 S. C. R. 896; Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1911) 219 U. S. 498, 31 S. C. R. 279.
5 Cincinnati, etc., Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission,
(1896) 162 U. S. 184, 40 L. Ed. 935. 16 S. C. R. 700; United States v.
Illinois Terminal R. Co., (1909) 168 Fed. 546.
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cars, etc., but the fact that the shipment is interstate gives Congress the power over it, and by that grip it has jurisdiction over all
the agents employed, and instrumentalities used, in its transportation.
If the federal government has control over an agent it may
determine its liability to shippers and extend that liability so as to
include acts done or omitted by connecting carriers.8 It may
determine the liability of the carrier to its employees, and extend
such liability beyond the common law rule; and a state court is
required to administer the law, although the law of the state, as
to liability in such a case, may be different from the federal law.,
The Act to Regulate Commerce, approved February 4, 1887,
as amended 8 does not cover all the subjects which Congress has
the constitutional power to regulate. Nor is any restriction in the
Act, affecting its operation, to be considered as a legislative construction of the constitutional limits to which Congress may go in
regulating commerce.
Coming now to the question whether Congress has power
under the constitution to regulate all rates charged by interstate
carriers, for intrastate as well as interstate carriage, we note
first that the present Act expressly excludes transportation wholly
within a state from its operation. The proviso in section 1 of
the Act declares:
"That the provisions of this Act shall not apply to the transportation of passengers or property, or to the receiving, delivering,
storage, or handling of property wholly within one state, and not
shipped to or from a foreign country .

.

This is a restriction which Congress has placed upon its own
agency. It does not determine the limit of Congressional power.
In the Minnesota Rate Cases,9 the Supreme Court of the United
States, speaking through Mr. Justice Hughes, said:
"The power of Congress to regulate commerce among the
several states is supreme and plenary. It is complete in itself,
may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the constitution. ...
There is no room in our scheme of government for the assertion
8 Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, (1911). 219 U. S.
186,7 55 L. Ed. 167, 31 S.C. R. 164.
Mondou v. New York, etc., R. Co., (1912) 223 U. S. 1, 56 L. Ed.
327, 32 S. C. R. 169, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 44.
8 8 U. S. Compiled Stat. Annot. 1916 Secs. 8563-8604.
9 (1913) 230 U. S. 352 (398-9), 57 L. Ed. 1511, 33 S. C. R. 729, 48

L. R.A. (N. S.) 1151.
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of state power in hostility to the authorized exercise of federal
power. The authority of Congress extends to every part of interstate commerce, and to every instrumentality or agency by which
it is carried on; and the full control by Congress of the subjects
committed to its regulation is not to be denied or thwarted by the
commingling of interstate and intrastate operations."'10
Again, referring to the proviso in section 1 above quoted, the
Court said :11

"Congress did not undertake to say that the intrastate rates of
interstate carriers should be reasonable or to invest its administrative agency with authority to determine their reasonableness.
Neither by the original act nor by its amendment did Congress
seek to establish a unified control over interstate and intrastate
rates; it did not set up a standard for intrastate rates, or prescribe, or authorize the Commission to prescribe, either maximum
or minimum rates for intrastate traffic.

. .

The fixing of

reasonable rates for intrastate transportation was left where it
had been found; that is, with the States and the agencies created
by the states to deal with that subject."
After reviewing the decisions recognizing the power of the
states under existing law to regulate intrastate rates the opinion
proceeds 12
"To suppose, however, from a review of these decisions, that
the exercise of this acknowledged power of the state may be permitted to create an irreconcilable conflict with the authority of the
Nation, or that through an equipoise of powers an effective control of interstate commerce is rendered impossible, is to overlook
the dominant operation of the constitution which, creating a
Nation, equipped it with an authority, supreme and plenary, to
control National commerce and to prevent that control, exercised
in the wisdom of Congress, from being obstructed or destroyed
by any opposing action."
Referring to the interblending of operations by an interstate
carrier conducting both interstate and intrastate business, the
Court said :'3

"But these considerations are for the practical judgment of
Congress in determining the extent of the regulation necessary
under existing conditions of transportation to conserve and promote the interests of interstate commerce. If the situation has
become such, by reason of the interblending of the interstate and
intrastate operations of interstate carriers, that adequate regulation of their interstaterates cannot be maintained without impos10 Italics are the author's. [Ed.]
11 (1913) 230 U.S. 352 (420), 57 L.Ed. 1511, 33 S.C.R. 729, 48
L.R.A. (N.S.) 1151.
12 Ibid p. 431.
'sIbid p. 432-3.
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ing requirements with respect to their intrastate rates which substantially affect the former, it is for Congress to determine, within
the limits of its constitutional authority over interstate commerce
and its instruments the measure of the regulation it should supply.
It is the function of this court to interpret and apply the law
already enacted, but not under the guise of construction to provide
a more comprehensive scheme of regulation than Congress has
decided upon. Nor, in the absence of federal action, may we deny
effect to the laws of the state enacted within the field which it is
entitled to occupy until its authorityis limited through the exertion
4
by Congress of its paramount constitutional power."'
The exertion of its plenary power over intrastate traffic, foreshadowed in the Minnesota Rate Case, has found expression in
legislation, which has been sustained by the Supreme Court, controlling interstate carriers in matters affecting intrastate traffic.
Prior to the passage of what is known as the Safety Appliance
Act, 15 the states had the same control over instrumentalitiescars and engines, etc.-used in intrastate commerce that they had
and now have over rates for intrastate traffic. The states passed
safety appliance laws applicable to cars and engines engaged in
intrastate traffic. Congress passed a safety appliance law and
restricted the operation of the Act to.cars "engaged in interstate
commerce." This act did not cure the existing evils. The act was
amended and made to apply to all cars and vehicles of every
description "used on a railroad engaged in interstate commerce."
The agents and the railroad were subject to the regulating power
of Congress. This act, if constitutional, took from the states all
control over cars and engines used in intrastate traffic. It came
before the Supreme Court in Southern Railway v. United States,'
and the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Van Devanter, construed the act "to embrace all locomotives, cars and similar vehicles used on any railroadwhich is a highway of interstate commerce." And upon the question of its constitutionality, the Court
said :
"We come, then, to the question whether these acts are within
the power of Congress under the commerce clause of the constitution, considering that they are not confined to vehicles used in
moving interstate traffic, but embrace vehicles used in moving
intrastate traffic. The answer to this question depends upon another, which is, Is there a real or substantial relation or connection
14 Italics are the author's. [Ed.]
15 8 U. S. Compiled Statutes, 1916, Secs. 8605-50.
16 (1911) 222 U. S. 20, 56 L. Ed. 72, 32 S. C. R. 2.
27 Ibid p. 26.
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between what is required by these acts in respect of vehicles used
in moving intrastate traffic, and the object which the acts obviously
are designed to attain; namely, the safety of interstate commerce
and of those who are employed in its movement? Or, stating it
in another way, Is there such a close or direct relation or connection between the two classes of traffic, when moving over the
same railroad, as to make it certain that the safety of the inter-.
state traffic and of those who are employed in its movement will
be promoted in a real or substantial sense by applying the requirements of these acts to vehicles used in moving the traffic which
is intrastate as well as to those used in moving that which is
interstate?"
Reviewing the facts showing an intermingling of cars used in
interstate and intrastate traffic and the effect of differing appliances upon cars in the same train, the Court concluded :18
"These practical considerations make it plain, as we think,
that the questions before stated must be answered in the affirmative."
Again the question of a uniform system of accounting for all
carriers in any way subject to the Act, was before the Court.
The Commission insisted that carriers subject to the act, both rail
and water carriers, should report and keep the accounts of all of
their receipts and expenditures, from intrastate traffic as well as
from interstate traffic, and from sources of private business
where the accounts were mingled, in accordance with the uniform
system formulated by the Commission. The carriers insisted that
neither Congress nor the Commission had authority to regulate
intrastate business, and therefore could not require reports, nor
prescribe the accounting to be kept of such business. The Supreme
Court speaking through Mr. Justice Day said :9
"Bookkeeping, it is said, is not interstate commerce. True, it
is. not, but bookkeeping may and ought to show how a business
which, in part, at least, is interstate commerce, is carried on, in
order that the Commission, charged with the duty of making
reasonable rates and prohibiting unfair and unreasonable ones,
may know the nature and extent of the business of the corporation, the cost of its interstate transactions, and otherwise to inform itself so as to enable it to properly regulate the matters
which are within its authority. We think the uniform system of
accounting prescribed and the report called for are such as it
is within the power of the Commission to require under section
18 Ibid p. 27.
19 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich
(1912) 224 U. S. 194 (216), 32 S. C. R. 436.

Transit

Co.,
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20 of the act. Nor do the requirements exceed the constitutional
authority of Congress to pass such a law."
The states in the exercise of their police power may make
quarantine regulations to prevent the introduction or spread of
disease which affect interstate commerce, but these state regulations are subject to the paramount authority of Congress to
regulate the subject matter. 2 The state regulation must give way
whenever Congress legislates upon the subject. A state may
determine the liability of a carrier for loss or damage to property
within its territory; but only until such time as Congress legislates
21
upon the subject matter.
In the Shreveport Case,22 the state of Texas had established
rates between Texas cities which were lower than the interstate
rates charged to and from Shreveport, La., to the same points in
Texas. The Interstate Commerce Commission found that these
intrastate rates created undue preferences and were unlawful, and
ordered the interstate carriers to equalize the rates for like distances upon their lines. This gave the carriers the right to lower
the interstate rates, which had been found reasonable by the
Commission, or to raise the intrastate rates to the level of the
interstate. The carriers elected to raise the intrastate rates. As
this directly affected intrastate rates made by the state it was,
claimed that the order was beyond the power of Congress and the
Commission to make. In passing upon this question the Supreme
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Hughes, said :23
"It is for Congress to supply the needed correction where the
relation between intrastate and interstate rates presents the evil
to be corrected, and this it may do completely by reason of its
control over the interstate carrier, in all matters having such a
close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that it is
necessary or appropriate to exercise the control for the effective
government of that commerce.
"It is also clear, that, in removing injurious discrimination
against interstate traffic arising from the relation of intrastate to
interstate rates, Congress is not bound to reduce the latter below
what it may deem to be a proper standard fair to the carrier and
20 Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. Louisiana State
Bd. of Health, (1902) 186 U. S. 380, 22 S. C. R. 811; Asbell v. Kansas,
(1908) 209 U. S.251, 52 L. Ed. 778. 28 S.C. R. 485. 14 Ann. Cas. 1101.
21 Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, (1913) 226 U.S. 491 (500), 57
L. Ed. 314, 33 S.C. R. 148, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 257.
22 Houston, etc., Ry. Co. v. U. S., (1914) 234 U. S. 342, 58 L. Ed.
1341, 34 S.C. R. 833.
23 Ibid p. 355.
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to the public. Otherwise, it could prevent the injury to interstate
commerce only by the sacrifice of its judgment as to interstate
rates. Congress is entitled to maintain its own standard as to
these rates and to forbid any discriminatory action by interstate
carriers which will obstruct the freedom of movement of interstate traffic over their lines in accordance with the terms it
establishes."
Referring to the proviso in section 1 above quoted, the Court
said :24
"Congress thus defined the scope of its regulation and provided
that it was not to extend to purely intrastate traffic. It did not
undertake to authorize the Commission to prescribe .intrastate
rates and thus to establish a unified control by the exercise of the
rate-making power over both descriptions of traffic.
"We are of the opinion that the limitation of the proviso in
section one does not apply to a case of this sort. The Commission
was dealing with the relation of rates injuriously affecting, through
an unreasonable discrimination, traffic that was interstate. The
question was thus not simply one of transportation that was
'wholly within one state.

.

.

.

Such a matter is one with

which Congress alone is competent to deal and, in view of the
aim of the action and the comprehensive terms of the provisions
against unjust discrimination, there is no ground for holding
that the authority of Congress was unexercised and that the subject was thus left without governmental regulation."
Again :2

"We are not unmindful of the gravity of the question that is
presented when state and federal views conflict. But it was
recognized at the beginning that the Nation could not prosper if
interstate and foreign trade were governed by many -masters,
and, where the interests of the freedom of interstate commerce
are involved, the judgment of Congress and of the agencies it
lawfully establishes must control." 6
Many instances could be given which establish the doctrine

that Congress has the constitutional power to regulate the practices of every agent of interstate commerce. It may declare by
what instrumentalities and by what carriers interstate commerce
shall be carried.2 7 Jurisdiction over the subject of commerce, or
over the agents of commerce, or the instrumentalitiesof commerce,
gives to Congress the plenary right to regulate and determine all
matters affecting such agencies, instrumentalities and subjects.
24 Ibid p. 357-8.
25 Ibid p. 359-60.
6Italics are the author's. [Ed.]
27 Pipe Line Cases, (1914) 234 U. S. 548, 34 S. C. R. 956.
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These broad powers necessarily include the right to determine all
the rates and charges which a carrier engaged in interstate commerce shall make upon its line of railroad, if a condition has
arisen requiring such regulation. That is to say, paraphrasing
the language of the Supreme Court, if Congress determines that
the regulation of intrastate rates, charged by interstate carriers,
is necessary under present conditions to conserve and promote
the interests of interstate commerce, it may assume control and
regulate all the rates charged by such carriers. The regulation of
rates is not a greater, nor a different power than that exercised in
determining what safety appliances shall be used upon the cars
and engines used upon a railroad carrying interstate traffic. If
Congress has the power to take from the states their power to
regulate the instrumentalities used in intrastate transportation;
if it may, by its regulation of interstate carriers, supersede the
police regulations made by a state; if it may determine the
relation between intrastate and interstate rates, and authorize
interstate carriers to raise an intrastate rate, it requires no additional power to fix all the rates for any distance, and for all distances, that shall be charged by such a carrier. If the power
granted by the constitution is adequate for the purposes above
detailed it is quite sufficient to warrant Congress in fixing all
rates, if conditions exist requiring such additional regulation. It
only remains, therefore, to consider whether the exigencies, at
the present time, call for the broader exercise of its power by
Congress.
The policy of the federal government. expressed in the Act
to Regulate Commerce, is very aptly stated in Texas & Pacific
Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 28 where the court, speaking
through the Chief Justice, said:
"That the Act to Regulate Commerce was intended to afford
an effective means for redressing the wrongs resulting from unjust
discrimination and undue preference is undoubted. Indeed, it is
not open to controversy that to provide for these subjects was
among the principal purposes of the Act."
In New York, New'Haven & Hartford Railroad Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission29 the same justice, speaking for the
Court said:
28 (1907) 204 U. S. 426 (439), 51 L. Ed. 553, 27 S. C. R. 350, 9 Ann.
Cas. 1075.
29 (1906) 200 U. S. 361 (391), 50 L. Ed. 515, 26 S. C. R. 272.
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"It cannot be challenged that the great purpose of the Act to
Regulate Commerce, while seeking to prevent unjust and unreasonable rates, was to secure equality of rates as to all and to
destroy favoritism."
If we go back of the Act to the commerce clause of the constitution we find the motive for introducing it very clearly stated
in the opinion in the Minnesota Rate Cases, where Mr. Justice
Hughes, speaking for the Court, said :30
"The conviction of its necessity sprang ftom the disastrous
experience under the Confederation when the states vied in discriminatory measures against each other. In order to end these
evils, the grant in the constitution conferred upon Congress an
authority at all times adequate to secure the freedom of interstate commercial intercourse from state control and to provide
effective regulation of that intercourse as the national interest
may demand."
There exists, today a serious and growing conflict between
federal and state authority over the fixing, and effect of statemade rates. This conflict grows out of precisely the same fundamental conditions that existed under the Confederation. It
expresses itself in a different way but in spirit, and in purpose, it
is the same. Some states, in order to give undue preference to
their own citizens and cities, have fixed intrastate rates much
lower than existing interstate rates for the same distances, By
this state policy, cities within a state are protected against competition in cities over the line in another state. This was the
finding, and the basis of the decision in the Shreveport Case.
The Minnesota Rate Cases furnish striking examples of the
demoralization of rate structures by the action of state commissions. In that case, Shepard v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co.,31 Judge
Sanborn states:
"Moorhead, Minn., Fargo and Bismarck, N. D., Billings and
Butte, Mont., are so-called 'jobbing centers.' Prior to the taking
effect of the order of September 6, 1906, they had always been
accorded rates by the Northern Pacific Company which would
allow them to compete in distribution of merchandise with their
nearest neighbors and with St. Paul and Minneapolis and Duluth.
The sum of car load rates from St. Paul, Minneapolis, and
Duluth to these centers and the less than car load rates out'fiom
these centers to the territory geographically tributary to them,
respectively, had been such as to compare favorably with rates in
30 (1913) 230 U. S. 352 (398).. 57 L. Ed. 1511, 33 S. C. R. 729, 48 L.
R.A. (N. S.) 1151.
31 (1911) 184 Fed. 765 (780).
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and out of their local competitors as well as with less than car
load rates from St. Paul, Minneapolis, and Duluth into the territory geographically served by them, respectively. The order of
September 6, 1906, as supplemented by the order of May 3, 1907,
substantially reduced car load rates from Duluth, St. Paul, and
Minneapolis to Moorhead. This reduction would have given
Moorhead a substantial advantage in territory accessible to its
jobbing industry, and not only as against Fargo unless car load
rates to Fargo should have been similarly reduced, but also as
against Duluth, St. Paul, and Minneapolis unless less than car
load rates from these points to points geographically accessible to
Moorhead, which included a considerable territory in North
Dakota, should have been proportionately reduced. This reduction, unless accompanied by a corresponding reduction in car load
rates to Fargo from the eastern terminals, would have served to
build up Moorhead at the expense of Fargo, and therefore to discriminate unduly and unjustly against Bargo as a matter of fact,
and would ddstroy the relation in rates which had theretofore
existed between the sum of car load rates into Moorhead and
less than car load distributing rates on the'one hand, and less than
car load distributing rates from Duluth, St. Paul, and Minneapolis
to localities accessible to Moorhead on the other. If Fargo were
protected as against Moorhead by a like reduction in car load
rates, it would have an advantage and preference over Bismarck
in territory common to them both and an advantage over the eastern terminals in territory common to Fargo and them, unless car
load rates from the eastern terminals to Bismarck and less than
car load rates from the eastern terminals to the territory accessible to Fargo should be correspondingly reduced; and this advantage would constitute an undue and unjust preference to Fargo
as against Bismarck, which .competes in certain territory with
Fargo, unless rates on car load lots from the eastern terminals to
Bismarck should be correspondingly reduced. And so on, from
distributing point to distributing point."
Commenting upon this situation Mr. Justice Hughes speaking
for the Supreme Court of the United States in the Minnesota Rate
Cases, said :32
"The situation is not peculiar to Minnesota. The same question has been presented by the appeals, now before the court,
which involve the validity of intrastate tariffs fixed by Missouri,
Arkansas, Kentucky and Oregon. Differences in particular facts
appear, but they cannot be regarded as. controlling. A scheme
of state rates framed to avoid discrimination between localities
within the state, and to provide an harmonious system for intrastate transportation throughout the state, naturally would embrace
those places within the state which are on or near the state's
32 (1913) 230 U. S. 352 (394-5). 57 L. Ed. 1511, 33 S. C. R. 729, 48
L. R. A. (N.S.) 1151.
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boundaries; and, when these are included in a general reduction
of intrastate rates, there is, of course, a change in the relation
of rates as theretofore existing to points adjacent to, but across,
the state line. Kansas City, Kansas, and Kansas City, Missouri;
East St. Louis, Illinois, and St. Louis, Missouri; Omaha, Nebraska, and Council Bluffs, Iowa; Cincinnati, Ohio, and Covington and Newport, Kentucky; and many other places throughout
the country which might be mentioned, present substantially the
same conditions as those here appearing with respect to localities
on the boundaries of Minnesota. It is also a matter of common
knowledge that competition takes but little account of state lines
and in every part of the land competitive districfs embrace points
in different states."
Some states have fixed intrastate passenger rates much lower
per mile than are charged interstate passengers. As a result these
state-protective rates create unfair discrimination between shippers and travelers, and between contiguous cities. This has
resulted in grave friction between the federal and state authorities
and produced much litigation. The federal government and
the Interstate Commerce Commission have been brought into
many of these suits and the action of the federal power has been
bitterly attacked by state officials. While the law was settled,
under the present Act, in the Shreveport Case, the efforts to
secure undue preferences by states still continue and are increasing. Shippers try to reconsign their shipments at state lines to
secure the lower state rates. Passengers alight from trains to
get lower state fares or secure them in advance. Rate adjustments, covering large territories, are broken down by the action
of a state, and a general demoralization of interstate traffic exists
in many parts of the country.
The Act to Regulate Commerce expressly forbids "any undue
or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular .
locality, or any particular description of traffic." This is the
federal policy and the only policy which can result in fair treatment to all cities and shippers. Commercial competition between
cities does not take account of state lines; two cities compete for
trade within a state, and properly so, although a state line may
run between them. Changes in modes of communication and in
doing business have made the United States, industrially, one
common territory. It is vastly more important to the country at
large that its foreign and interstate commerce shall be maintained
and advanced than that purely local intrastate commerce should
be "protected," or that any state should be permitted to build up
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the business of its cities to the prejudice and disadvantage of
cities lying outside its borders. It is of grave importance that
this conflict of laws should be terminated and that the policy of
equality of treatment to all persons and localities should be
universal throughout the nation. The interest of the people calls
not merely for economical transportation, but for administration
without unfair discrimination or favoritism; it calls for a broad
outlook and a unified national policy. In determining whether
undue preference or advantage exists upon the line of a railroad
engaged in interstate commerce, state lines, as such, should receive
no consideration. This is one Nation. Favoritism to one city,
with disadvantage to another, is as injurious to the country
as a whole, when such city is favored by state regulation as it
is when it is preferred by a railroad company. In fact when
such discrimination is caused by state regulation, it is a double
evil; it creates favoritism that. is contrary to the spirit and
policy of the nation, and, at the same time, creates a conflict of
laws and litigation that is destructive of national unity. If
a city should not be unjustly preferred in rates to the disadvantage of another city, then it is equally true that a state
should not be preferred to the disadvantage of other states. The
law of equality and the prevention of favoritism should be
It
uniformly applied throughout the country as a whole.
should not be left to the carriers, as it is now, to take out
discrimination between interstate and intrastate traffic by raising
the state-made rate to the level of the interstate rate. The federal
government should exercise full and exclusive control of all rates
charged by interstate carriers; the entire scope of rate-making
would then be with the federal administrative commission to work
out equal treatment to all in the process of regulation. The
economic development of cities depends upon transportation. A
comparatively small difference in a freight rate, upon a given
commodity, may destroy the principal business of a city and give
the business to another locality. The state cannot deal with the
whole subject involved in a given case; it can only deal with the
portion of the traffic within its. border; the federal government
alone can deal with the question as a whole. As was said by
the Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice McKenna, in
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R.
Co. :3
3 (1910)

218 U. S. 88. 54 L. Ed. 946, 30 S. C. R. 651.
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"The outlook of the Commission and its powers must be
greater than the interest of the railroads or of that which may
affect those interests. It must be as comprehensive as the interests of the whole country."
If the conditions existing under the Confederation justified
the giving of exclusive jurisdiction to regulate interstate and
foreign commerce to the federal government, and if the present
well established policy of equality to all shippers and localities is
to prevail over the entire Union, then the time has come when
the regulation of all rates charged by interstate carriers, for any
distance upon their lines, and the control of all regulations and
practices, by such carriers, should be exercised exclusively by the
federal government. That this can be done without any amendment to the constitution of the United States we believe is clearly
established.
CHARLES WILLIS NEEDHAM.
WAsioNGToN, D. C.

